小學作文唔畀寫「雪糕」？老師圈錯改「冰淇淋」港媽大控訴：香港只有雪糕車 掀網民總動員考證｜Juicy叮 來源網址 : 小學作文唔畀寫雪糕老師圈錯改冰淇淋港媽大控訴香港只有雪糕車-掀網民總動員考證Juicy叮

小學作文唔畀寫「雪糕」？老師圈錯改「冰淇淋」港媽大控訴：香港只有雪糕車 掀網民總動員考證｜Juicy叮

有港媽昨日（14日）在社交平台發帖，為讀小學的孩子抱不平，其小朋友的作文功課，寫「雪糕」兩字被老師用紅筆圈起，並在上方寫上「冰淇淋」作更正，老師「改錯」行為令她非常困惑：「點解中文作文唔可以寫雪糕？要寫冰淇淋？」

帖文發布不足一天已掀起極大迴響，錄得逾36萬次瀏覽及1.1萬個點讚，逾千名網民湧入留言區，掀起一場關於「雪糕」與「冰淇淋」的用語大戰。

來源網址 : 星島頭條

https://www.stheadline.com/local-topics/3552946/

[July 21, 2019] A night I was so enraged that I couldn't forget, a night the Hong Kong & China Government has colluded with Traid Gang Members, together with Police assulting Anti-Government Protesters.

Before this day, we still believe Hong Kong was a place of law and order. We were shocked and furious watching live on TV and social media witnessing a regime working together with Gangsters to rule the society. It happened in movie but it went true that night.

After that night, my homeland has long gone. It has passed the point of no-return.

Years later on court, the assigned judge defined the incident was characterized as a mutual confrontation between two groups, not solely an assault by the white-clad group on civilians. It is blurring the line between black and white and calling a spade a shovel!

It is indiscriminate assault, this is terrorism.

Background

The events in Yuen Long on July 21, 2019, occurred amid the 2019–2020 Hong Kong protests, which began in March 2019 against a proposed extradition bill that would allow suspects to be sent to mainland China for trial. These protests evolved into broader demands for democracy, police accountability, and protection of Hong Kong's autonomy under the "one country, two systems" framework. Tensions were high, with frequent clashes between protesters and police. In the lead-up to July 21, there were warnings in Yuen Long—a district in the New Territories near the border with mainland China—about potential violence. Local villagers and pro-Beijing figures, including Legislative Council member Junius Ho, had publicly urged action against protesters, with some online posts calling for residents to "protect their homeland." Rumors circulated that triad (organized crime) members might target protesters dressed in black, the common attire for demonstrators.

On July 21 itself, a large protest organized by the Civil Human Rights Front took place on Hong Kong Island, drawing around 138,000–430,000 participants marching from Causeway Bay to Sheung Wan. The march started peacefully but escalated into violence near the Chinese government's Liaison Office, where protesters defaced the national emblem, blocked roads, and clashed with police. Police resources were heavily focused on Hong Kong Island, leaving areas like Yuen Long understaffed.

Sequence of Events

In the evening of July 21, 2019, a mob of approximately 100–700 men dressed in white shirts and armed with wooden sticks, metal rods, poles, and rattan canes gathered in Yuen Long. They were suspected by many observers and victims to have ties to triads and local villages. Around 10:00–10:30 pm, the assailants began attacking people on the streets, targeting those in black clothing (associated with protesters returning from the Hong Kong Island demonstration), as well as journalists, bystanders, and commuters. The violence escalated when the mob stormed the Yuen Long MTR (subway) station around 10:45 pm, assaulting people on the concourse, platforms, and inside train carriages. Victims included pro-democracy lawmaker Lam Cheuk-ting, who was severely injured (requiring 18 stitches), a pregnant woman, and ordinary residents like chef Calvin So. The attacks were indiscriminate, with reports of beatings continuing intermittently until around 3:55 am on July 22.

Despite over 24,000 emergency calls to the 999 hotline starting from around 10:45 pm, police response was delayed. Two officers arrived briefly at 10:52 pm but left, citing being outnumbered and lacking protective gear. A larger group of about 30 officers arrived at 11:20 pm—39 minutes after the initial attacks and shortly after the main mob had dispersed. No immediate arrests were made, even though police encountered some white-shirted men with weapons; in one instance, officers were seen patting an armed man on the shoulder before letting him go. Police stations in the area reportedly closed their gates to citizens seeking help, and some hotline operators advised callers to stay home if they were afraid.

Allegations of Police Inaction and Collusion

The incident sparked widespread allegations of police negligence, inaction, or even collusion with the attackers. Critics, including pro-democracy lawmakers like Eddie Chu and Lam Cheuk-ting, pointed to the delayed response, the lack of arrests on the night, and prior warnings that police relatives had allegedly shared with residents (e.g., advising against wearing black). Videos showed pro-Beijing politician Junius Ho shaking hands with white-shirted men, calling them "heroes" and thanking them for their "hard work," though Ho claimed he was unaware of the attacks at the time and defended the mob as reacting to protester violence. Former Independent Commission Against Corruption investigator Stephen S.N. Char suggested police misconduct, comparing it to past incidents during the 2014 Umbrella Movement.

Police denied collusion, attributing the delay to stretched resources from the Hong Kong Island clashes and claiming they saw no ongoing criminal activity upon arrival. However, investigations by journalists, such as Bao Choy's documentary for RTHK, revealed police presence in Yuen Long earlier in the evening without intervention, leading to her prosecution (later overturned on appeal) for accessing public records. The Independent Police Complaints Council (IPCC) report in 2020 concluded there was no direct evidence of collusion but acknowledged online calls for violence from both sides, describing the event as a "gang fight" rather than a one-sided attack—a narrative shift criticized as downplaying the mob's role.

Responses from Government and Authorities

Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam condemned the violence but refused to label it a "riot," unlike some protester actions. Chief Secretary Matthew Cheung issued an apology for the handling but expressed full support for the police. Pro-Beijing figures portrayed the attacks as a defensive response to protesters "invading" Yuen Long, with some media blaming demonstrators for provocation. Internationally, the U.S. condemned the "orchestrated violence," the UK monitored the probe closely, and countries like Japan and South Korea issued travel warnings. Pro-democracy groups called it "terrorism," comparing it to state-sanctioned violence.

Aftermath

At least 45 people were injured, some seriously, with no fatalities reported. Initial arrests were minimal, but by 2021, seven attackers were sentenced to 3.5–7 years in prison for rioting and wounding—the first convictions related to the incident. Paradoxically, some victims, including Lam Cheuk-ting, were later arrested and charged with rioting, accused of escalating the situation. A district council task force investigated but faced obstructions, especially after the 2020 national security law stifled dissent. The event eroded public trust in police, fueled further protests (e.g., a march in Yuen Long on July 27 leading to more clashes), and became a symbol of alleged government-triad ties to suppress the movement. As of 2025, victims and activists continue to seek full accountability, though official narratives have evolved to frame it as mutual violence rather than a targeted mob attack.

[July 17, 2025] "Bad-Debt Bank" Proposal in Hong Kong?

The news about a proposed "bad-debt bank" in Hong Kong originated from reports published by reputable financial news outlets on July 17, 2025. Specifically, sources like The Business Times, The Straits Times, Bloomberg, and The Edge Malaysia reported that some of Hong Kong’s major banks, including Hang Seng Bank and Bank of Communications, were in early-stage discussions with advisory firms about setting up a special vehicle to manage non-performing loans (NPLs). These discussions were spurred by a significant increase in soured loans, estimated at US$25 billion to US$32 billion, primarily tied to the struggling real estate sector, and specific cases like New World Development’s refinancing. The proposed entity was reportedly modeled after China’s distressed asset managers, aiming to help banks offload bad debts and recoup a portion of the loans. The reports cited sources familiar with the matter, who spoke anonymously due to the private nature of the discussions, and noted that the talks were preliminary with no clear indication of traction among banks or regulators

These articles highlighted the growing concern over Hong Kong’s non-performing loans, which reached a two-decade high of 2% of total loans by March 2025, according to Fitch Ratings estimates based on Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) figures. The real estate sector’s challenges, including a surge in office vacancies and a more than 50% drop in commercial property valuations, were cited as key drivers behind the discussions. The reports also mentioned a recent US$11 billion refinancing deal for New World Development as an example of efforts to avert deeper financial crises in the sector.

Is It Fake News?

The claim that Hong Kong banks were discussing the creation of a "bad-debt bank" does not appear to be fake news, as it was reported by multiple credible sources with consistent details. However, on the same day as these reports (July 17, 2025), the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) issued statements denying any intention to set up a "bad bank" and affirmed that Hong Kong banks maintained healthy balance sheets. These statements were shared via posts on X by accounts such as @FirstSquawk, @LiveSquawk, @RedboxWire, @iNewsroom, and @MarketNews_Feed, emphasizing the HKMA’s position that no such plan was in place and that the banking sector’s asset quality was manageable.

The HKMA’s denial suggests that while discussions among banks may have occurred, as reported, there was no official or regulatory endorsement of the "bad bank" proposal. The HKMA further stated that banks’ provisions were sufficient and that the banking sector’s capital ratio (24.2% as of March 2025) and liquidity coverage ratio (182.5% for major banks) were well above international standards, indicating financial stability

How a "Bad Debt Bank" Works

A "bad debt bank," often referred to as an asset management company (AMC) or distressed asset vehicle, is a financial institution or special-purpose entity created to acquire, manage, and dispose of non-performing loans (NPLs) and other distressed assets from banks or financial institutions. The primary goal is to clean up the balance sheets of banks, allowing them to focus on core lending activities while mitigating systemic risks to the financial system. Here’s how it typically works:

1. Acquisition of Bad Assets: The bad debt bank purchases NPLs (loans where borrowers have defaulted or are unlikely to repay) from commercial banks, often at a discount reflecting the impaired value of the loans. This transfer removes toxic assets from the banks’ books, improving their financial health and regulatory ratios.
2. Funding Mechanism: Bad debt banks are typically funded through a combination of government backing, bond issuance, or capital from private investors. In some cases, the government may provide guarantees or subsidies to facilitate operations.
3. Asset Management and Recovery: The bad debt bank manages the distressed assets by restructuring loans, negotiating with borrowers, or selling the assets (e.g., underlying collateral like real estate) to recover as much value as possible. This may involve legal action, asset sales, or converting debt into equity.
4. Resolution and Disposal: The bad debt bank aims to resolve the NPLs over time, either by recovering funds through repayments or by selling the assets to third parties, such as private investors or distressed asset funds. The proceeds are used to repay creditors or investors.
5. Systemic Benefits: By removing bad loans from banks, the bad debt bank helps stabilize the financial system, restores lending capacity, and reduces the risk of broader economic fallout from widespread defaults.

Reference: The Straints Times, DotDotNews

Three major protest movements in Hong Kong prior to 2019 Anti-Extradition Protest

2003 Article 23 Protest

Background: 

Article 23 of Hong Kong’s Basic Law required the city to enact laws prohibiting acts such as treason, secession, sedition, and subversion against the Central People's Government.

Protest: 

On July 1, 2003, around 500,000 people marched through downtown Hong Kong to protest the proposed national security legislation, fearing it would undermine civil liberties and freedom of expression.

Outcome: 

The massive protest led to the withdrawal of the bill after key political allies pulled their support. The government deferred and later removed the bill from the legislature.

Significance: 

This was one of the largest protests since the 1997 handover and demonstrated the strength of public opposition to perceived erosions of Hong Kong’s freedoms.

2012 Patriotic (Moral and National) Education Controversy

Background: 

The Hong Kong government proposed introducing a new school curriculum called Moral and National Education (MNE), aiming to foster national identity and teach about China’s history and culture.

Controversy: 

The curriculum was criticized for its pro-Communist Party stance and for disparaging Western democratic systems, raising concerns about political indoctrination and “brainwashing”.

Protests: 

Student groups like Scholarism and large segments of the public organized protests, including an occupation of government headquarters, hunger strikes, and mass rallies. At one point, up to 120,000 people demonstrated outside government offices.

Outcome: 

On September 8, 2012, the government backed down, making the classes optional rather than mandatory, following weeks of intense public pressure.

2014 Umbrella Revolution (Umbrella Movement)

Background: 

Triggered by a decision from China’s National People’s Congress Standing Committee that restricted the nomination process for Hong Kong’s Chief Executive, effectively allowing only Beijing-approved candidates to run.

Protests: 

Starting on September 26, 2014, students and pro-democracy activists began a series of sit-in street protests, occupying major city intersections, particularly in Admiralty, Causeway Bay, and Mong Kok.

Symbol: 

Protesters used umbrellas to shield themselves from police pepper spray and tear gas, giving the movement its name.

Scale: 

At its peak, the movement saw over 100,000 people occupying parts of the city, bringing daily life to a standstill.

Demands: 

Protesters called for genuine universal suffrage and the right to freely nominate and elect Hong Kong’s leader.

Outcome: 

The protests ended in December 2014 without the government meeting the protesters’ demands, but the movement had a lasting impact on Hong Kong’s political consciousness and activism.

These three events are pivotal in Hong Kong’s recent history, each reflecting deep public concerns about autonomy, freedom, and identity under Chinese sovereignty.

Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have tightened its control over various regions and policies, often at the expense of commitments or promises made in international agreements or foundational documents.

1. Tibet Autonomy:

After promising Tibet a form of self-rule when it became part of China, the Chinese Communist Party gradually took away its autonomy, imposed direct control, and restricted Tibetan traditions and religious practices.

2. Hong Kong Autonomy and Suffrage:

Despite promising Hong Kong a high level of self-government and the eventual right to freely elect its leaders, the Chinese Communist Party has steadily reduced Hong Kong’s autonomy, tightened political control, and failed to deliver on promised democratic reforms.

3. WTO Market Opening:

Although China promised to open its markets and allow fair competition for foreign businesses when it joined the World Trade Organization, it has kept many restrictions in place, favoring its own companies and limiting foreign access in important industries.

4. 1989 Tiannanmen Square
The 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre began with large student-led protests in Beijing demanding political reform, greater freedoms, and an end to corruption. By early June, hundreds of thousands of people had gathered in and around Tiananmen Square, drawing support from workers, farmers, and others across China. On the night of June 3–4, the Chinese government sent in troops and tanks to forcibly clear the square, resulting in soldiers opening fire on protesters and bystanders, with hundreds—possibly thousands—killed and many more arrested. The government has since suppressed all public discussion of the event, and it remains a highly sensitive topic in China.

Everything about British National (Overseas)

British National (Overseas) (BN(O)) is a special type of British nationality created for residents of Hong Kong before the 1997 handover to China. It was introduced in 1985 to allow people who were British Dependent Territories Citizens (BDTC) connected with Hong Kong to retain a form of British nationality after sovereignty transferred to China on 1 July 1997.

Who are BN(O)s?
People who registered as British National (Overseas) before 1 July 1997, mainly Hong Kong residents with BDTC status. About 2.9 million people hold BN(O) status, with around 720,000 holding valid BN(O) passports as of 2025.

Nationality status:
BN(O)s are British nationals and Commonwealth citizens, but not British citizens. They do not have the automatic right to live or work in the UK without a visa and are subject to UK immigration controls.

Rights and privileges:
BN(O)s can hold British passports and receive consular protection from UK diplomatic posts outside China, Hong Kong, and Macau. They are exempt from visa requirements for short visits (less than six months) to the UK. They have some rights in the UK as Commonwealth citizens, such as voting rights and eligibility to serve in most civil service roles and the armed forces.

Historic Background about BN(O)s:

Before the creation of British National (Overseas) (BN(O)) status, residents of Hong Kong held a form of British nationality called British Dependent Territories Citizen (BDTC), formerly known as Citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies (CUKC) under the British Nationality Act 1948. Under the British Nationality Act 1948, Hong Kong residents were CUKCs, which gave them British nationality with rights tied to the colonies, including Hong Kong. This status was based on jus soli (right of the soil), meaning birth in the territory conferred nationality.

The British Nationality Act 1981, effective from 1983, redefined British nationality categories. It replaced CUKC status with new categories, including British Dependent Territories Citizenship (BDTC) for Hong Kong residents. BDTC status was linked specifically to the dependent territory (Hong Kong) and did not grant the right to live or work in the UK. The Act was passed during the period when the UK was negotiating the future of Hong Kong with China, which culminated in the Sino-British Joint Declaration (1984), agreeing that Hong Kong would be handed over to China in 1997.

The UK government foresaw that after the handover of Hong Kong to China in 1997, Hong Kong residents would lose their BDTC status because Hong Kong would no longer be a British dependent territory. To maintain a form of British nationality for Hong Kong residents without granting full British citizenship or the right of abode in the UK, the UK created the British National (Overseas) status under the Hong Kong Act 1985. BN(O) status was a voluntary registration available only to BDTCs connected with Hong Kong between 1987 and 1997. It allowed holders to retain a British nationality status and hold BN(O) passports after the handover. However, BN(O) status did not grant the right to live or work in the UK and holders were subject to UK immigration controls. Those BDTCs who did not register as BN(O) and had no other nationality became British Overseas Citizens (BOCs) after the handover, a status with even fewer rights.

Political and social context:
The British government was concerned about a potential large influx of Hong Kong residents to the UK after 1997, similar to the migration of Ugandan Asians in the 1970s, so it deliberately limited the rights attached to BN(O) status. The 1981 nationality changes and BN(O) creation effectively cut off full British citizenship rights from the majority of Hong Kong’s population, especially ethnic Chinese residents, reflecting the UK's intention to relinquish sovereignty over Hong Kong and control migration. This led to criticism that the UK government "abandoned" many Hong Kong residents by denying them full British citizenship and the right of abode in the UK.

Sino-British Joint Declaration (1984) 

The Sino-British Joint Declaration is a treaty signed on 19 December 1984 between the United Kingdom and the People’s Republic of China, which set the terms for the transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong from Britain to China on 1 July 1997. Under this agreement, Hong Kong would become a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China, maintaining a high degree of autonomy except in foreign affairs and defense. The declaration guaranteed that Hong Kong’s existing capitalist system, legal system, and way of life would remain unchanged for 50 years after the handover, until 2047, under the principle of “one country, two systems.” The treaty was registered with the United Nations in 1985 and remains legally binding according to the UK government. 

The background to this agreement lies in Hong Kong’s colonial history: it had been a British colony since 1842, with the New Territories leased to Britain for 99 years starting in 1898. As the lease approached expiration in 1997, Britain and China negotiated to peacefully resolve Hong Kong’s future, balancing China’s sovereignty claims with the need to maintain Hong Kong’s economic and political stability. The Joint Declaration laid out China’s basic policies for governing Hong Kong after the transfer, including establishing the SAR with a high degree of autonomy and preserving its social and economic systems separate from mainland China. Since 2014, China has claimed the treaty is no longer legally binding, arguing it expired with the handover, while the UK insists it remains in force.  Despite these disputes, the Joint Declaration remains a foundational document governing the relationship between the UK, China, and Hong Kong.

Anti-Extradition Compaign (2019) and National Secruity Law (2020) 

The Anti-Extradition Campaign in 2019 began as widespread protests in Hong Kong against a proposed extradition bill that would have allowed suspects to be sent to mainland China for trial. Many Hongkongers feared this law would undermine the city’s judicial independence and expose residents to unfair trials and political persecution. The protests quickly grew into a broader pro-democracy movement demanding greater political freedoms and opposing perceived encroachments by Beijing on Hong Kong’s autonomy. 

In response to these protests and ongoing unrest, China imposed the National Security Law (NSL) on Hong Kong in 2020. This law criminalizes acts of secession, subversion, terrorism, and collusion with foreign forces, with penalties up to life imprisonment. It grants Beijing broad powers to intervene in Hong Kong’s legal system, including establishing a mainland-controlled security office exempt from local jurisdiction. The law also expands police powers to conduct searches without warrants, freeze assets, and censor online content. It applies not only to Hong Kong residents but also to foreigners and non-permanent residents, and it restricts those found guilty from holding public office. The National Security Law was introduced to suppress dissent and restore control after the 2019 protests, but it has been widely criticized for undermining the freedoms promised under the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration. The law marks a significant tightening of Beijing’s grip on Hong Kong, effectively curbing political opposition and freedom of expression in the city. The UK has criticized China for actions seen as undermining Hong Kong’s autonomy, such as imposing the National Security Law in 2020 and altering electoral laws, which it views as breaches of the Joint Declaration.

BNO Visa (2021) and the U.K. Government 

The British National (Overseas) (BN(O)) visa scheme was launched by the UK government on 31 January 2021 to provide a pathway for Hong Kong residents holding BN(O) status and their eligible family members to live, work, and study in the UK. This visa reflects the UK’s historic and moral commitment to the people of Hong Kong who chose to maintain their ties with the UK before the 1997 handover. The visa allows an initial stay of 30 months, extendable by another 30 months or up to 5 years, after which holders can apply for indefinite leave to remain (settlement) and, subsequently, British citizenship. 

The UK government states that the policy is “in recognition of the unprecedented circumstances in Hong Kong, the UK’s historic commitment to the people of Hong Kong through the Joint Declaration, and our unique obligations towards those who elected to retain their ties with the UK through obtaining BN(O) status.” The scheme was introduced in response to Beijing’s imposition of the National Security Law on Hong Kong in 2020, which the UK government viewed as undermining the autonomy and freedoms promised under the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration. The BN(O) visa offers a safe alternative for those concerned about the changing political environment in Hong Kong. It does not require applicants to have a BN(O) passport or meet minimum income or skills requirements, but applicants must show they can support themselves initially.

[Jun 12, 2019] A date destined to be marked in the History of Hong Kong.

6 years ago on this exact same day, it sparked a rally, protest and fight against the totalitarian regime. It marked a watershed of Hong Kong history and we shall never forget!