UK Problem

If you tax people who work

and pay people who don't work

Don't feel surprised people start to not working

水之道 The Tao of Water (đạo của nước)

The Tao of Water

Water always finds a way forward because it does not fight with the rocks… nước luôn tìm được đường đi vì nó không chiến đấu với đá ...

Water flows around whatever blocks it; it has no need to win, only to reach its destination… nước chảy quanh những gì cản trở nó, không cần thắng, chỉ cần đến ...

For water, the shortest path is not the straightest one, but the path of least resistance… đối với nước, con đường ngắn nhất không phải là con đường thẳng nhất, mà là con đường ít kháng cự nhất ...

When it meets a deep cliff, water becomes a waterfall;
when it meets flat land, water becomes a river;
when it meets the sun, water becomes drifting clouds… khi gặp vực sâu, nước hoá dòng thác, khi gặp mặt đất, nước hoá dòng sông, khi gặp mặt trời, nước hoa mây bay ...

Water clings to no fixed shape, yet wherever it is, it always finds a way to exist… nước không bám vào hình dạng nào, nhưng ở đâu, nước cũng tìm được cách để tồn tại ..

The softness of water is the wisdom of those who understand that you don’t need to win in order to go far. sự mềm mại của nước là trí tuệ của kẻ hiểu rằng không cần thắng để đi xa.

The secret of water is neither resisting the flow nor forcing a direction. bí mật của nước là không chống lại dòng chảy, cũng không cưỡng cầu hướng đi.

As long as it keeps flowing, water will eventually reach the sea! chỉ cần vẫn trôi, nước sẽ về với biển!

No, Hong Kong’s Governance Is Not Becoming Like China’s. It’s Actually Worse. - Owen Au

Hong Kong is stuck in a governance vacuum, where neither democratic nor authoritarian accountability functions effectively.

文：區倬僖（Owen Au，前中文大學學生會會長） 2025年12月11日

The fire in Tai Po on November 26 was Hong Kong’s deadliest blaze in decades: it killed at least 160 people, with dozens still missing. While the tragedy itself was horrifying, the Hong Kong government’s reaction has been equally alarming. Instead of demonstrating accountability and responsiveness to public concern, authorities have adopted a defensive posture centered on political security.

11月26日的大埔大火是香港數十年來最慘烈的火災，奪去至少160條人命，至今仍有數十人失蹤。悲劇本身固然恐怖，但特區政府的反應同樣令人心寒。當局非但沒有展現問責精神或回應公眾焦慮，反而擺出一副以「政治安全」為核心的防禦姿態。

Many observers see the official handling of the aftermath as another sign that Hong Kong is becoming more like mainland China. In reality, the situation is more troubling. Hong Kong has weakened its own accountability mechanisms without acquiring the governance tools that operate in the mainland. Rather than converging with Beijing’s party-state model, Hong Kong is actually performing worse in moments of crisis.

許多觀察家認為，官方這種善後手法是香港「大陸化」的又一鐵證。但現實其實更令人不安：香港自斷了原有的問責手腳，卻又學不到大陸那套管治工具。香港並非與北京的黨國模式接軌，反而在危機關頭，表現比大陸更爛。

A Disastrous Response to Disaster 災難級的應變

From the outset, the government’s approach to the fire was highly politicized and combative. In the immediate aftermath, Chief Executive John Lee’s public remarks prioritized repeated expressions of gratitude to Chinese President Xi Jinping before supporting local efforts to relieve the incident. Reporters directly questioned why firefighters were acknowledged only as an afterthought.

政府處理這場大火的手法，從一開始就高度政治化，甚至充滿敵意。事發後，特首李家超公開發言，頭等大事竟是一再感謝國家主席習近平，然後才輪到支援本地救災。有記者當場質問，為何前線消防員的拼搏反成了陪襯。

The government then moved quickly to cast expressions of public concern as a security threat. The National Security Office warned of “hostile forces” using the disaster to disrupt Hong Kong, framing individuals who voiced dissatisfaction as “distorting the efforts of the government.”

政府隨即迅速將公眾的關切定性為安全威脅。駐港國安公署警告有「敵對勢力」利用災難搞亂香港，將表達不滿的人扣上「扭曲政府努力」的帽子。

As the fire raised concerns over potential corruption issues, a university student who urged a comprehensive investigation and demanded accountability was arrested by national security police for sedition. Volunteers delivering supplies to affected families reported intimidation by the government-led community service corps, and some were even detained. More recently, foreign journalists were summoned by Beijing’s security agency in Hong Kong and warned against publishing information that could “distort” the government’s relief efforts. Meanwhile, local commentators announced they could no longer write about the fire due to “obvious reasons.”

隨着大火引發對潛在貪腐的質疑，一名促請全面調查及要求問責的大學生，遭國安警以煽動罪拘捕。據報，有義工向受災家庭派物資時，遭政府主導的社區服務隊恐嚇，部分人甚至被拘留。最近，更有外國記者被北京駐港國安機構傳召，警告不得發布可能「扭曲」政府賑災工作的資訊。同時，本地評論員亦以「顯而易見的原因」為由，宣佈不再評論大火。

These actions highlighted a governing approach shaped primarily by political risk mitigation rather than public administration. In today’s Hong Kong, public sentiment and civic engagement are treated as potential security concerns. While the situation in Hong Kong is often described as resembling that in the mainland, this comparison overlooks crucial distinctions. Despite the authoritarian system under Beijing’s rule, mainland authorities do possess institutional mechanisms that absorb public pressure and enforce administrative responsibility in ways Hong Kong currently does not.

這些舉動凸顯了一種管治邏輯：比起公共行政，官員更在意規避政治風險。在今天的香港，民意與公民參與被視為潛在的安全隱患。雖然外界常說香港越來越像大陸，但這種比較忽略了關鍵區別。儘管大陸在北京治下實行威權體制，但大陸當局確實擁有一套能吸納公眾壓力和執行行政責任的制度機制，而這正是香港目前所欠缺的。

How Hong Kong Is Worse Than Mainland China 香港何以比大陸更差

When comparing Hong Kong’s reaction with how various levels of government in the mainland have handled similar crises, the distinctions are clear.

若將香港的反應與大陸各級政府處理類似危機的手法相比，高下立見。

In 2010, following a residential tower fire in Shanghai that killed 58 people, Beijing immediately dispatched a State Council investigation team. Subsequently, 26 people, including government officials, were charged with criminal offenses, and the Communist Party disciplined 28 others. On top of that, Shanghai’s mayor at the time publicly apologized. Acknowledging public sentiment, the authorities handled large-scale mourning cautiously and without violent suppression, even as hundreds of thousands gathered to demand accountability.

2010年，上海靜安區一幢住宅大樓發生大火，釀成58死，北京隨即派出國務院調查組。結果26人被刑事起訴，包括政府官員，共產黨亦處分了另外28人。此外，時任上海市長公開道歉。當局意識到民憤，即使有數十萬人聚集要求問責，亦審慎處理大規模悼念，未有暴力鎮壓。

Similarly, after the 2021 Henan floods, which caused nearly 400 deaths, the State Council released a detailed report outlining institutional failures. The report resulted in eight criminal prosecutions and disciplinary measures against 89 officials, including several mayors and deputy mayors.

同樣地，2021年河南水災造成近400人死亡後，國務院發布了一份詳盡報告，列出制度缺失。該報告導致8人被刑事起訴，89名官員受紀律處分，包括多名市長及副市長。

While mainland China is also guilty of suppressing criticism and dissent, it has the structural tools to pursue at least modest accountability, and the confidence to allow a tightly controlled safety valve for the fiercest anger.

雖然中國大陸同樣會壓制批評與異見，但它擁有結構性工具以推行至少適度的問責，並有自信容許一個受嚴密監控的「安全閥」來疏導最猛烈的民憤。

In Hong Kong, however, no comparable mechanisms operated after the Tai Po fire. Despite more than a dozen arrests of individuals allegedly responsible for causing the fire, no government official has apologized or faced formal inquiry. The administration has not released preliminary investigative findings, and basic information about victims remains limited.

反觀香港，大埔大火後並無類似機制運作。儘管有十多人因涉嫌導致火災被捕，但無政府官員道歉或面臨正式調查。當局尚未發布初步調查結果，有關受害者的基本資訊仍然有限。

Meanwhile, calls for a Commission of Inquiry were rejected in favor of a review committee that lacks statutory authority. Instead of demonstrating administrative responsibility, the Hong Kong government’s primary tools were centered on information control and political containment.

同時，社會要求成立獨立調查委員會的呼聲被拒，取而代之的是一個缺乏法定權力的檢討委員會。特區政府並未展現行政責任，其主要手段反而集中於資訊控制和政治圍堵。

Governance Vacuum 管治真空

These differences are rooted in deeper institutional divergence. Mainland China’s ability to respond to disasters in a structured manner is tied to its system of political promotion. Extensive studies have shown that the Chinese Communist Party relies heavily on performance-based legitimacy, particularly in crisis management. Officials are evaluated on measurable outcomes, and failure can result in rapid disciplinary action. This was evident during the pandemic, when Beijing placed clear priority on the zero-COVID policy – the ability to contain outbreaks and maintain public health was directly tied to the career prospects of local officials. Those who failed to implement containment measures were quickly removed or reprimanded.

這些差異源於深層次的制度分歧。中國大陸有能力以結構化方式應對災難，與其政治晉升制度息息相關。大量研究顯示，中國共產黨極其依賴「績效合法性」（performance-based legitimacy），尤其是在危機管理方面。官員的評核基於可量化的結果，一旦失敗可能導致迅速的紀律處分。這在疫情期間尤為明顯，北京將「動態清零」列為首要任務——遏制疫情及維持公共衛生的能力直接與地方官員的仕途掛鈎。未能實施防控措施的官員會被迅速免職或譴責。

Hong Kong’s governance traditions evolved differently. Many of its key accountability mechanisms were designed and institutionalized during the final decades of British rule, when the colonial government sought to develop Hong Kong into a prosperous global city grounded in professionalism, public accountability, and the rule of law. For instance, the Commissions of Inquiry Ordinance, enacted in 1968, was designed precisely to handle major incidents requiring independent scrutiny. The Legislative Council also possessed meaningful powers to investigate official misconduct under the Powers and Privileges Ordinance.

香港的管治傳統演變迥異。其許多關鍵的問責機制是在英國統治的最後幾十年設計及制度化的，當時殖民地政府試圖將香港發展成建基於專業、問責及法治的繁榮國際城市。例如，1968年制定的《調查委員會條例》，正是為了處理需要獨立審視的重大事故。立法會亦曾擁有實權，可根據《權力及特權條例》調查官員失職。

These mechanisms, however, can function effectively only in a political environment that favors checks and balances. Since the political turmoil in 2019, these oversight tools have been politically constrained or rendered symbolic.

然而，這些機制只有在重視制衡的政治環境下才能有效運作。自2019年政治風波以來，這些監察工具若非受到政治掣肘，便是淪為象徵。

Calls for a Commission of Inquiry now evoke associations with the 2019 protest demands, placing them in a politically sensitive category. The Legislative Council, now composed exclusively of pro-Beijing “patriots” after the 2021 electoral reform, no longer acts as an independent oversight body and has shown little inclination to challenge the executive. The impotence of the current law-making body was highlighted by the embarrassing moment when legislative candidates in the recent election were too afraid to express differing views even during the debate session.

如今，要求成立調查委員會的呼聲會令人聯想到2019年的抗議訴求，因而被歸類為政治敏感範疇。經過2021年選制改革後由「愛國者」全盤掌握的立法會，不再作為獨立的監察機構，亦鮮有表現出挑戰行政機關的意願。早前選舉論壇上，候選人竟不敢發表異見，場面尷尬，凸顯了現屆議會的無能。

Hong Kong has hollowed out the institutional mechanisms that once ensured accountability and effective governance, but it has not developed the structures that support stability in mainland China. The result is a governance vacuum, in which neither democratic nor authoritarian accountability functions effectively.

香港掏空了昔日確保問責和有效管治的制度機制，卻未有發展出支撐中國大陸穩定的結構。結果造成了管治真空，民主與威權問責皆無法有效運作。

Limitations Under “One Country, Two Systems” 「一國兩制」下的局限

What is more problematic is that, even under the new political reality shaped by Beijing’s predominant influence, Hong Kong lacks the conditions to replicate the governance model of the mainland under the de jure framework of “One Country, Two Systems.”

更棘手的是，即便在北京主導的新政治現實下，香港亦缺乏條件在「一國兩制」的法理框架下複製大陸的管治模式。

In mainland China, a multilayered hierarchy separates local administrations from the central government. This arrangement allows Beijing to discipline local officials without implying failure at the top. The Communist Party’s extensive cadre system, drawing from membership of more than 100 million, also ensures that replacements are readily available. Local officials can be removed with limited political cost.

在大陸，地方行政與中央政府之間存在多層級架構。這種安排容許北京懲處地方官員，而不致令人覺得最高層失職。共產黨擁有逾一億黨員的龐大幹部系統，亦確保替補人選充足。撤換地方官員的政治成本有限。

Hong Kong lacks these institutional buffers. As a Special Administrative Region, senior officials are appointed by and report directly to Beijing. Any admission of administrative error thus risks reflecting poorly on the central government’s oversight. The political cost is even higher today, as Beijing has constructed a narrative of having restored stability and governance effectiveness in Hong Kong following recent crackdowns. Acknowledging serious failures by the city’s government would undermine the rationale for its post-2019 political restructuring.

香港缺乏這些制度緩衝。作為特別行政區，高官由北京任命並直接向其負責。承認任何行政失誤，都有損害中央政府監察形象的風險。鑑於北京已建立了一套經近期整治後香港重回穩定與「由治及興」的論述，承認特區政府嚴重失職將削弱2019年後政治重組的理據，因此今天的政治代價更高。

Moreover, the principle of “Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong” restricts the ability to draw replacements from the broader mainland bureaucracy. Senior officials must be Hong Kongers personally trusted by Beijing, making rapid substitution practically challenging and politically risky.

此外，「港人治港」原則限制了從廣大的大陸官僚體系調任替補的能力。高層官員必須是北京個人信任的港人，這使得迅速換人在實際操作上充滿挑戰，在政治上亦具風險。

This structure traps Hong Kong between two governance models. It has weakened the institutions that once supported its administrative legitimacy, yet it cannot adopt the systems of performance-based accountability that make Chinese authoritarianism sustainable. In this context, political suppression becomes one of the few viable tools available to manage discontent.

這種結構使香港夾在兩種管治模式之間，進退維谷。它削弱了昔日支撐其行政認受性的制度，卻無法採納使中國威權主義得以持續的績效問責制。在此背景下，政治壓制成了管控不滿情緒僅存的可行手段之一。

Conclusion 結語

The Tai Po fire revealed more than weaknesses in emergency planning. It exposed deeper structural problems in Hong Kong’s current governance model. The city has moved away from the institutional traditions that once made it administratively credible, yet it cannot adapt the mechanisms that enable mainland China to maintain stability through performance and accountability.

大埔大火不僅暴露了應急計劃的弱點，更揭示了香港現行管治模式深層次的結構問題。這個城市背離了昔日確立其行政公信力的制度傳統，卻無法適應大陸透過績效與問責維持穩定的機制。

As long as Beijing values the appearance of “One Country, Two Systems,” Hong Kong will not be able to replicate the mainland’s approach to crisis governance. But without rebuilding its own institutions of transparency and responsibility, the city risks further erosion of public trust and administrative capacity.

只要北京仍重視「一國兩制」的面子，香港便無法複製大陸的危機管治模式。但若不重建自身的透明度與責任制度，這座城市將面臨公眾信任與行政能力進一步被侵蝕的風險。

Hong Kong is not becoming more like mainland China. It is becoming something more fragile and less capable of governing itself effectively.

香港並非變得更像中國大陸。它正演變成一種更脆弱、更無力作有效自我管治的怪胎。